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Chris Cataldi

CliniciansClinicianFiled October 19, 2026193 wordsFDA-2026-N-7874-0362
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Themes it raises

5 of the 21 themes in the docket, each with the passage we counted, verbatim.
Records that let investigators reconstruct an eventFDA Q19, Q21, Q24, Q26
“every agentic action should produce a tamper-evident receipt, so failures are auditable rather than arguable.”
Trading premarket certainty for postmarket monitoringFDA Q18
“on Question 18, accepting greater premarket uncertainty is reasonable only if postmarket surveillance is real, continuous, and staffed, not a plan on paper.”
Watching the device after it shipsFDA Q19, Q20
“I support the shift toward continuous postmarket monitoring in the actual environment of use, including monitoring the underlying foundation model for drift”
What makes a function high riskFDA Q1, Q2, Q5
“what matters most is what the system is permitted to do, not just what it might say.”
Devices that plan and take actionsFDA Q26
“Human gates belong at the action layer, and every agentic action should produce a tamper-evident receipt, so failures are auditable rather than arguable.”

FDA questions it names

Questions this filing names by number.

Q18 · Trading premarket certainty for postmarket monitoring

Machine-assisted draft, pending human review. The source text and highlighted passages appear below. Read the filing on regulations.gov ↗

The comment as filed

Comment submitted on regulations.gov. Passages we counted are highlighted.

These comments reflect my own views as a registered nurse and do not represent the views of my employer or any organization I am affiliated with.

As a practicing CRNA and founder of a clinical-AI company building agentic systems for anesthesia, I support the paper’s two-axis risk framework and urge CDRH to treat action authority — not output variability — as the decisive axis: what matters most is what the system is permitted to do, not just what it might say. Human gates belong at the action layer, and every agentic action should produce a tamper-evident receipt, so failures are auditable rather than arguable. I support the shift toward continuous postmarket monitoring in the actual environment of use, including monitoring the underlying foundation model for drift — and on Question 18, accepting greater premarket uncertainty is reasonable only if postmarket surveillance is real, continuous, and staffed, not a plan on paper. Finally, the periodic clinician review the paper envisions should draw explicitly on practicing bedside clinicians: the failure modes of AI in clinical care are workflow failures, and the people who know the workflow are the people delivering the care. — Chris Cataldi, CRNA