← All 95 filings

Michelle Bernabe, RN, BSN

CliniciansClinicianFiled September 10, 2026685 wordsFDA-2026-N-7874-0086
“it must supplement strong premarket evidence, not replace it.”

What they argued

RecovryAI’s one-line reading of the filing.

M2/M4 from her sections on questions 10-16: supports proportionate pathways but requires prospective clinical validation for high-risk systems, evaluation of the human-AI team including nurses, and comparison against safe, adequately staffed care rather than an understaffed baseline. M3 is opposition, stated directly in her section on questions 18-21: postmarket monitoring must supplement strong premarket evidence, not replace it, and patients should not become involuntary test subjects. M5 from her section on questions 24 and 26: change control accepted with enforceable conditions (version traceability, detection of material changes before they affect care, revalidation plus FDA review, suspension and rollback). autonomy_high is advise, from her requirement that clinicians be able to question, override and stop AI recommendations and that a real person accept responsibility; she states no level for low-consequence functions, and she does not address patient-facing device autonomy, so M1 is N. She writes in an individual capacity as an RN, not for National Nurses United.

Themes it raises

13 of the 21 themes in the docket, each with the passage we counted, verbatim.
What makes a function high riskFDA Q1, Q2, Q5
“FDA should assess both function and real conditions of use: reversibility, urgency, vulnerability, error detection, traceability, scale, staffing, and workflow.”
Escalating too little and too muchFDA Q6
“risk includes missed and unnecessary warnings”
Whether benchmark results prove anythingFDA Q9, Q10, Q16
“benchmarks alone are not enough for systems that influence diagnosis, triage, treatment, escalation, or monitoring”
Proving the device works in real careFDA Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, Q15
“comparisons should be against safe, adequately staffed care, not an understaffed environment that makes a product appear beneficial”
Trading premarket certainty for postmarket monitoringFDA Q18
“it must supplement strong premarket evidence, not replace it”
Watching the device after it shipsFDA Q19, Q20
“a machine should not be the sole supervisor of another machine”
Who is accountable when something goes wrongFDA Q21
“manufacturers must remain responsible for surveillance, correction, and transparent communication”
Controlling a device that keeps changingFDA Q22, Q23, Q24, Q25
“material changes should be detected before they affect care, followed by appropriate revalidation and fda review”
Devices that plan and take actionsFDA Q26
“agentic systems that plan, initiate actions, or interact with other systems require a higher standard because errors can propagate before a person can intervene”
Whether human oversight is real oversightFDA Q3, Q4, Q14, Q20, Q21, Q26
“nurses and other clinicians must be able to question, override, document concerns about, and stop unsafe ai recommendations without retaliation”
Records that let investigators reconstruct an eventFDA Q19, Q21, Q24, Q26
“every clinically relevant output should be traceable to a specific model version”
What patients are told and can demandFDA Q3
“patients and clinicians should know when ai shapes care and who remains accountable.”
What counts as a reportable eventFDA Q19, Q20
“monitoring should cover subgroup performance, adverse events, near misses, changing errors, and protected frontline reporting.”

FDA questions it names

Questions this filing names by number.

Q1 · The two-axis risk frameworkQ2 · The spectrum of device activityQ3 · When an output becomes directiveQ4 · Generalist and specialist usersQ5 · Multi-turn conversations that migrateQ6 · Care escalation functionsQ10 · Benchmark contamination and saturationQ11 · Clinical confirmation without a prospective trialQ12 · Statistically meaningful performanceQ13 · Synthetic dataQ14 · Comparators and acceptance criteriaQ15 · Performance against usual careQ16 · Independent third partiesQ18 · Trading premarket certainty for postmarket monitoringQ19 · Postmarket performance evaluationQ20 · Machine-based supervisory agentsQ21 · Clinicians, institutions and societiesQ24 · Third-party foundation model changesQ26 · Agentic devices

Across the five cross-cutting questions

RecovryAI’s reading of the whole filing. Silence is never counted as opposition.
Patient-facing autonomyShould FDA permit patient-facing AI to act with meaningful autonomy within a defined scope?
No position stated
Proportionate evidenceShould evidence requirements scale with clinical risk rather than a uniform high bar?
Supports with conditions
Postmarket relianceCan strong postmarket monitoring justify accepting more premarket uncertainty?
Opposes
Competency evaluationCan a device be evaluated on competency benchmarks and clinical confirmation against clinicians?
Supports with conditions
Change controlCan devices on third-party foundation models be maintained under pre-specified change control?
Supports with conditions
Autonomy acceptedThe highest level this filing accepts
Low-consequence work: Not stated
High-consequence work: Advises
Machine-assisted draft, pending human review. The source text and highlighted passages appear below. Read the filing on regulations.gov ↗

The comment as filed

Comment submitted on regulations.gov. Passages we counted are highlighted.

i am a Columbia University-trained registered nurse with more than a decade of frontline experience, including psychiatric emergency care. i write Moral Health about narrative medicine, health reform, and responsible innovation. i submit in my individual capacity, not for National Nurses United. my recommendations align with NNU’s Nurses and Patients’ Bill of Rights.

i am an innovation enthusiast. generative ai may help patients understand and participate more fully in their care. it may help clinicians synthesize complex information, uncover patterns that might otherwise be missed, support earlier and more personalized interventions, strengthen communication and care coordination, reduce administrative burdens, extend expertise to underserved communities, and accelerate research and discovery. some of its most meaningful uses may still be waiting to be imagined. but innovation in health care must begin with safety. the people affected by these systems are our friends, partners, parents, children, neighbors, and eventually ourselves. when an ai-generated output enters care, it enters a relationship of trust among a patient, family, nurse, and clinical team.

1. build the risk framework around real conditions of care

in response to questions 1 through 6, FDA should assess both function and real conditions of use: reversibility, urgency, vulnerability, error detection, traceability, scale, staffing, and workflow. risk includes missed and unnecessary warnings. classification should reflect what happens when a system is wrong and whether clinicians have the time, information, authority, and staffing to respond safely.

2. require real clinical evidence for high-risk systems

in response to questions 10 through 16, benchmarks alone are not enough for systems that influence diagnosis, triage, treatment, escalation, or monitoring. high-risk systems need prospective clinical validation across diverse patients and settings.

FDA should evaluate the human-AI team, including registered nurses, not only the model. testing should measure hallucinations, omissions, automation bias, verification time, cognitive burden, workflow disruption, overrides, delays, and near misses. comparisons should be against safe, adequately staffed care, not an understaffed environment that makes a product appear beneficial.

3. protect clinical relationships and professional judgment

ai should support relationships, not displace them. patients need a real person who can listen, explain, notice what does not fit, and accept responsibility. nurses and other clinicians must be able to question, override, document concerns about, and stop unsafe ai recommendations without retaliation.

an ai tool should never substitute for safe staffing. patients and clinicians should know when ai shapes care and who remains accountable. disclosure matters, but disclosure alone is not meaningful consent and does not make an unsafe system safe.

4. use postmarket monitoring to supplement strong premarket evidence

in response to questions 18 through 21, postmarket monitoring is essential because performance can change across populations, institutions, workflows, and time. it must supplement strong premarket evidence, not replace it. patients should not become involuntary test subjects.

monitoring should cover subgroup performance, adverse events, near misses, changing errors, and protected frontline reporting. a machine should not be the sole supervisor of another machine. manufacturers must remain responsible for surveillance, correction, and transparent communication.

5. place enforceable controls on model changes

in response to questions 24 and 26, every clinically relevant output should be traceable to a specific model version. material changes should be detected before they affect care, followed by appropriate revalidation and fda review. health systems need prompt suspension and rollback controls. agentic systems that plan, initiate actions, or interact with other systems require a higher standard because errors can propagate before a person can intervene.

i want us to pursue innovation with imagination, curiosity, and purpose. it can help make care safer, more humane, and more accessible. that pursuit must also account for competitive pressure, cost savings, and incentives to scale quickly, especially when the people who benefit are not the same people who bear the risks. a balanced framework should create proportionate pathways requiring strong evidence, transparency, human accountability, and enforceable safeguards when the stakes are high. safety is not opposition to innovation. safety is how we make innovation worthy of personal and collective trust.

when the patient is our friend, our partner, our parent, our child, or ourselves, human alignment must come first. those who benefit from ai must not transfer its risks to patients, families, nurses, and clinical teams.

michelle bernabe, RN, BSN
writer, Moral Health